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Citizen in Uniform:
Democratic Germany and
the Changing Bundeswehr
Jens O. Koltermann

O

The Innere Fuehrung with its corollary of “citizen in uniform” greatly
contributed to the fact that the Bundeswehr became not only a selfevident part of our society but also a reliable instrument of German
security policies.1
—Dr. Franz Josef Jung, Former German Defense Minister

n 12 May 1949, Germany’s three Western Military Governors (United
States, France and Great Britain) sent a letter to Dr. Conrad Adenauer,
the President of the Parliamentary Council. With some reservations, this letter
approved the Draft Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.2 In less
than two weeks, on 23 May 1949, the Constitution (or Basic Law) for the young
democracy was confirmed by the Parliamentary Council in a public session.3
The unique preamble of the Basic Law committed the German nation to the promotion of peace and European unity. The Basic Law did not, however, include
any articles regarding the establishment of armed forces.4 Even so, Germany
and its occupying powers were determined not to repeat the militarism and
fanaticism that had brought the nation and the world into two devastating wars
in the first half of the century.
The ensuing deepening East-West conflict necessitated a German
military contribution to defend Western freedom. This was especially evident
following the 1950 communist North Korean invasion of South Korea.5 The
United States urged its European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
partners to rearm Germany as a NATO member after the Pleven Plan for a
European Defense Community was rejected by the French national assembly in
1954.6 But German citizens, who had suffered two major wars, remained skeptical regarding their nation’s rearmament.7 Nonetheless, Chancellor Adenauer
managed to gain formal approval of rearmament, even though the majority
of Germans opposed it.8 He envisioned this as a way to restore Germany’s
sovereignty; a rearmed Germany would gain equal partnership within the
western alliance of democracies.9 On 12 November 1955, the 200th birthday
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of General Scharnhorst, the founding father of conscription in Prussia,10 the
first 101 volunteers joined the Bundeswehr.11 Two years later the first 10,000
conscripts were drafted.12
A central issue was how to guarantee that the new force would be an
integral part of the young democracy and not yield to antidemocratic tendencies in its ranks. This was especially important because much of its military
leadership would come from the veterans of the Wehrmacht and Reichswehr. In
October 1950, a Rearmament Commission established by Chancellor Adenauer
issued its initial proposal for the formation of a new German army. A group of
15 hand-picked former Wehrmacht officers met at the “Eifelkloster Himmerod”
under the lead of Adolf Heusinger13 and drafted the so-called “Himmeroder
Denkschrift” (Himmerod Memorandum),14 which became the founding document for the new Bundeswehr. The group strongly advised that the preconditions
for German rearmament should be totally different from those that led to the
Wehrmacht. They insisted that Germany’s new army should be closely integrated with German society and subordinate to civilian leadership.15 German
leaders did not want to create another “state within a state,”16 as happened with
the Reichswehr. Nor did they want the military to be misused politically or to
be subject to political indoctrinations, as was the Wehrmacht.17
The preamble of the Basic Law guided the new German national
vision: “Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal
partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law.”18 The founding fathers of the
Bundeswehr needed to ensure that the norms and values embodied in the Basic
Law would be assured in the Bundeswehr.19 Therefore, Lieutenant General Graf
von Baudissin20 advocated that the Bundeswehr be built on the principle of
Innere Fuehrung (leadership development and civic education), based on its
corollary of “citizen in uniform” (Staatsbuerger in Uniform).21 Civil-military
relations were established in accord with the Basic Law and in keeping with the
principle of Innere Fuehrung. To ensure that the Bundeswehr conformed to the
Basic Law, three pillars were established at its founding: the principle of Innere
Fuehrung, the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” and conscription of German
citizens for military service.
This article describes how Innere Fuehrung, with its corollary of
“citizen in uniform,” assured that the norms and values of the German Basic
Law were embedded in the Bundeswehr. It elaborates on this principle and
shows how Innere Fuehrung shaped the civil-military relationship in Germany.
The article then explains how the principle has remained intact through three
paradigm changes of the Bundeswehr:
•• Rearmament that included integration of former Wehrmacht and
Reichswehr soldiers.
•• Integration of former East German soldiers after reunification.
•• Performance of new worldwide missions.
It then considers the implications of a recent fourth paradigm change—
Germany’s transition to an all-volunteer force. Finally, the article offers some
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recommendations to ensure that Innere Fuehrung, with its corollary of “citizen
in uniform,” remains the guiding principle for the new all-volunteer Bundeswehr.

Innere Fuehrung (1st Pillar—Overarching Principle)
A simple definition or translation of Innere Fuehrung does not exist.22
Even the recent version of the ZDv 10/1 (Joint Service Regulation–Leadership
Development and Civic Education) offers more of an explanation than a definition of the concept.23 On the Bundeswehr website of the Ministry of Defense,
the concept is described as: “harmoniz[ing] the principles of a free and democratic constitutional state with the principles of order and operation required
by the armed forces to fulfill their constitutional mission. Today [2011] Innere
Fuehrung is more than ever a distinct hallmark of the German armed forces.”24
Leadership and civic education are two parts of Innere Fuehrung. In
German, “Fuehrung” means both.25 Within the Bundeswehr, both leadership
and civic eduation are essential to avoid the unquestioning and slavish obedience that characterized Nazi-Wehrmacht soldiers. Innere Fuehrung fosters
moral courage and encourages soldiers to defend their own beliefs. The soldiers’ “law on obedience” ensures that the values and norms of the Basic Law
are binding guidelines for soldiers in any situation.26 As a mandatory part of
leadership, civic education emphasizes Bundeswehr leaders’ duty to provide
political education for the soldiers to “intensify their knowledge of the values
and norms of the Basic Law.”27

“Citizen in Uniform” (2nd Pillar—1st Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)
The guiding corollary of “citizen in uniform” is the critical element of the
Innere Fuehrung concept; it guarantees the army’s link to the state and society.
In general, it guarantees soldiers the same rights as all other citizens while
serving in the Bundeswehr. Some basic rights are explicitly confirmed by the
Legal Status of Military Personnel Act (Soldatengesetz or SG).28 A few citizensoldiers’ rights are, however, restricted to avoid conflicts in loyalties between
the military and the state and to balance personal freedom with obligations to
the state.29 The principle of Innere Fuehrung balances the need for an efficient,
mission-ready military against the need to uphold society’s democratic values.

Conscription (3rd Pillar—2nd Vital Corollary to Innere Fuehrung)
The founding fathers of the Bundeswehr and the Parliament mandated a
conscript army based on lessons learned from the past. Conscription was seen
“as an organizational device to counteract anti-democratic political ambitions
of the officer corps of the armed forces.”30 In addition, every citizen has an
obligation to serve his country and thereby gain an understanding of the role
of the military in society and strengthen civil-military relations. Conscription
ensures that the military reflects all elements of society. As President Heuss
asserted, conscription slowly became the “legitimate child of democracy” in
West Germany.31
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Resting on these three pillars, Innere Fuehrung dynamically integrates
the unchangeable core values espoused in the Basic Law into the Bundeswehr.
It affirms the civil-military relation in Germany and it defines the self-image of
the Bundeswehr. Through the corollary of “citizen in uniform,” the Bundeswehr
became an integral part of the German state and society. It has enabled the nation’s
military to adapt to major changes in society, in the state, and in the world.

Paradigm Change 1: Rearmament and Integration of Former Wehrmacht
and Reichswehr Soldiers
The Reichswehr provided the armed forces for the first democratic
German state, the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). Its soldiers reflected the predemocratic attitudes prevalent in the Wilhelmine era. Because its officer corps
failed to accept parliamentary democracy, the Reichswehr essentially evolved
into “a state within [a] state” that eventually undermined the Republic.32 Its successor, the Wehrmacht, developed characteristics of extreme German militarism
committed to the ideals of National Socialism. Thus the Wehrmacht became a
willing means to achieve the perverted ends of the Third Reich (1933–1945).33
Consequently, the founders of the new Bundeswehr assiduously sought to avoid
any repetition of the catastrophic consequences of these former military forces.
The Himmerod Memorandum (9 October 1950) conveyed initial views
on how the new German armed forces should be designed. The memo asserted
that these forces had to be fundamentally different. Accordingly, in a chapter
entitled “Das Innere Gefuege” (inner structure), it recommended an innovative
approach for the new force; “Inneres Gefuege” was further developed into the
principle of Innere Fuehrung and its corollary of “citizen in uniform.”34 At this
time, public discussions of rearmament tended to be bitter and controversial.
Following the Allied programs of denazification, demilitarization, and democratization, Germans were not ready to rearm.35 Innere Fuehrung was designed
to gain public trust. The new armed forces would be created completely in
accord with the Constitution and the new military establishment would be an
integral part of society.
To guarantee strong civil control,36 command and control of the military
would be exercised by a Ministry of Defense under robust political leadership.
The principle “divide et impera” (divide and rule) within the Bundeswehr was
established. According to the Basic Law, a separate administrative substructure
was established beneath the military structure.37
General Ulrich de Maizière, one of the founding members of the
Bundeswehr, articulated four components of “Das Innere Gefuege.”38 First, the
armed forces would be integrated into an alliance that provided for a common
defense of Europe. This accorded with the intent of the preamble and Article
24 of the German Basic Law. Second, Germany’s armed forces would structure and train for a defensive mission, in accord with Article 87a of the Basic
Law.39 Any kind of offensive action was strictly forbidden.40 Third, Germany’s
armed forces would organize jointly to reduce the independence of the separate
military services. These services would fall under a single defense department

Summer 2012

111

Jens O. Koltermann

that controlled personnel, budget, and defense acquisitions. Fourth, the forces
would observe the Basic Law and submit to the primacy of civilian authority.
Thus, the Parliament controls the military in all matters.41
Given Germany’s history, civilian control of the military had to be
very strong and efficient. At the beginning, this requirement precipitated much
discussion and frustration within the Bundeswehr.42 Its leaders were especially
reluctant to yield direct civilian control of Bundeswehr soldiers.43 But this
political control was designed to ensure the linkage between the Bundeswehr
and the German state and society. It would also foster a democratic mindset
in the troops. Innere Fuehrung thus provided the means to gain and maintain
public trust in and support of the nation’s military.
Command over the Bundeswehr in peacetime was given to a civilian
Minister of Defense, supported by state secretaries (parliamentary and public
officials). Only in times of conflict (during actual or impending attacks) were
the powers of command transferred to the Federal Chancellor.44 The military
thus had no central command and control of its own. Its Generalinspekteur
(GenInsp), similar to a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), did not
outrank the civilian chiefs.45 In addition, as spelled out in the Basic Law, a Defense
Committee (Verteidigungsausschuss) was established to represent the members
of Parliament and to ensure parliamentary control over the executive and thus the
armed forces. During the early years, the Defense Committee was instrumental
in developing a legal framework for the young Bundeswehr.46 Finally, as an additional means of civil control, an independent Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Armed Forces was installed. This Commissioner oversaw the civil rights of
the soldiers and ensured adherence to the principles of Innere Fuehrung.47
In 1956, an independent Advisory Council on Questions of Innere
Fuehrung (Beirat fuer Fragen der Inneren Fuehrung) was established to
support the Minister of Defense in all matters pertaining to Innere Fuehrung
and to provide independent expert judgment on civil-military issues.48 In
another 1956 democratic initiative, German soldiers were granted the right to
elect a spokesperson. This individual mediated matters between soldiers and
their military superiors.49 Clearly, German leaders focused on building a legal
framework and control system to ensure that the new armed forces would be an
integral part of the new democratic Germany.50
But the so-called Himmerod compromise weakened the original intent
of reform.51 The traditionalist group tried to build an “optimized Wehrmacht”52
and thus preserve the strengths of the former organization. Even the US military raised some skeptical questions about the concept of Innere Fuehrung
and “citizen in uniform.” They feared these concepts would make the German
contribution to the NATO alliance less effective.53 Military sociologist Samuel
Huntington argued that it could “reduce the fighting effectiveness of the new
army”; he claimed “a democratic state is better defended by a professional force
than a democratic force.”54
So fifteen years after its creation,55 the Bundeswehr was mired in a deep
crisis; the tradionalists seemed to dominate. The Chief of the Army, Lieutenant

112Parameters

Citizen in Uniform

General Schnez, supported by most of his top leadership, demanded that German
society should adapt to serve the needs of the armed forces. Major General
Helmut Grashey denounced Innere Fuehrung as a farce.56 These traditionalists
advocated a return to a strong warrior culture. The concept of Innere Fuehrung
had obviously failed to permeate post-war Germany’s military culture.57 From
its top leaders all the way down the ranks, Bundeswehr personnel regarded
themselves as superior to society at large. Innere Fuehrung was at risk. The
Bundeswehr appeared ready to separate itself from society.
The situation quickly changed when the Social Democrats (SPD)
appointed their first Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt, on 19 October 1969.58
Schmidt proposed a new image for the Bundeswehr and a new kind of soldier
for the nation. He instituted military reform by changing the recruiting policy
and the education system for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).
Schmidt’s education reform began with better-educated officers. He organized
two Bundeswehr universities and mandated academic education for officers
beyond their basic military training. Relying on Baudissin’s ideal of “citizen in
uniform,” Schmidt’s new recruiting policy for Bundeswehr personnel sought
to build an army that reflected Germany’s pluralistic society. Through these
reforms, Schmidt broke the dominance of the old elites and diversified the officer
corps.59 In addition, Helmut Schmidt led the development of the first Joint Service
Regulation ZDv 10/1 (Assistance for Innere Fuehrung, classified: restricted).60
This military reform revitalized the concept of Innere Fuehrung and
affirmed the value of the “citizen in uniform.” For the first time in German
military history, a strong civil mindset displaced the formerly dominant military mindset. The conscript system ensured a place for the “citizen in uniform.”
It forced the Bundeswehr’s elder generation to accept a new type of soldier
envisioned by Helmut Schmidt.

Paradigm Change 2: The Integration of Soldiers of the National People’s
Army
On 1 October 1990, the secession of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) triggered the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. On the same day, all generals, admirals, and soldiers older than 55 were retired from the GDR’s National People’s Army (NPA)
(Nationale Volksarmee or NVA).61 Members of the political cadre and military
justice system had been retired earlier.62 More than 2.5 million East Germans
had served in the NPA between 1956 and 1990.63 At midnight on 3 October 1990,
the GDR national service flag was cased for the last time in all garrisons—the
NPA no longer existed. On the same day, 1,200 officers and NCOs from the
Bundeswehr occupied key positions in the former NPA.64 They came as Germans
to fellow Germans. Their mission was to win the hearts and minds of their former
Warsaw Pact adversaries.65
In this new security environment, the total German military force had
to be reduced from 600,000 to 370,000. At the same time, former NPA soldiers were integrated into the Bundeswehr.66 This was not an easy task. NPA
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soldiers came from a nondemocratic society. The NPA was a political army and
an instrument of dictatorship. The NPA had played an important role in socializing its young recruits into the GDR’s communist society.67 Their soldiers were
indoctrinated to believe that Innere Fuehrung and “citizen in uniform” were an
anti-democratic scheme “to create a human fighting machine, capable of independent, aggressive action and prepared to carry out criminal orders without
scruples.”68 Indeed, they claimed that only the NPA within the communist
regime could produce a “citizen in uniform.”69 In addition, these soldiers knew
nothing of Western values, which were denigrated under the communist regime.
Whereas Wehrmacht veterans joined a newly established military force,
these NPA veterans had to integrate into a 45-year-old organization with totally
different values and mindset. Also, they would not be considered for high-level
leadership positions, as Wehrmacht veterans were. Only 10,80070 former NPAsoldiers were accepted “for a two-year probationary contract.”71 Their Innere
Fuehrung education began immediately at military schools and academies in
West Germany. In addition to self-studies, they received practical training at
Bundeswehr installations in the West. Mobile training teams supported their
training, and former NPA soldiers were provided practical instruction at their
new locations.72 To continue their service, they had to demonstrate total assimilation into the Bundeswehr.
Like these former NPA soldiers, new conscripts from East Germany
had no democratic orientation.73 They were integrated into the three-month
basic training program with the West German conscripts and trained exclusively in West Germany.74 This was an important step for building a German
“army in unity” that joined together young people from different political
systems on a regular basis.75 These young soldiers were exposed to democratic
norms and values before they returned to their garrisons and homes in the
East. As of 2005, more than 600,000 East German youth had been conscripted
into the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehrs’ commitment to the Basic Law helped
to integrate these East Germans into a democratic society.76 These soldiers
were exposed to the principles of Innere Fuehrung during their time in the
Bundeswehr and to the norms associated with civilian control of the military.
Conscription was used to train soldiers in democracy and Basic Law. Indeed,
as these young East Germans donned their Bundeswehr uniforms, they learned
not only how to be “citizens in uniform” but also how to be democratic citizens.

Paradigm Change 3: Assignment of Worldwide Missions
According to the Basic Law, the Bundeswehr was authorized only to
defend Germany within its borders. All German administrations up to 1990
accepted this mandate. Therefore, missions abroad only provided humanitarian
support after a catastrophe. This concept changed with the fall of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of a new international security environment.
The Bundeswehr did not provide ground forces for the Gulf War, but it
did provide 11.8 billion Deutsche Mark (approximately $6.9 billion)77 to support
the operation.78 The Bundeswehr’s participation in Cambodia with the United
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Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 was its first real
deployment abroad.79 This was followed by German soldiers’ participation in
AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) flights to monitor the no-fly
zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina (DENY-FLIGHT), the UNOSOM II (United
Nations Operation in Somalia) mission in Somalia, and the naval blockade
against Serbia and Montenegro (SHARP GUARD). These operations triggered
legal complaints from two factional parliamentary parties. On 12 July 1994,
the Supreme Court declared that missions abroad conformed with the Basic
Law when authorized by Parliament.80 An incremental approach was taken to
adapt the Bundeswehr to its new missions and also to gain German society’s
acceptance of these changes.
Yet ten years after the Bundeswehr undertook its first mission, German
society seemed reluctant to support these new tasks. When in 2002 former
Minister of Defense Peter Struck declared that “Germany’s security [was] also
defended in the Hindu Kush,”81 this assertion triggered a lengthy and heated
public debate. One year later, the 2003 defense policy designated worldwide
missions as a primary task requiring further growth and reorganization of the
Bundeswehr.82 Three years later, a White Paper specified the most probable tasks
for the Bundeswehr: resolution of international conflicts, crisis management, and
the war against international terrorism.83 For the first time, official documents
publically described Bundeswehr’s operational reality. But these documents did
not foster needed discussion related to security policy in German society.
Operations in Afghanistan marked the first time since World War II that
German soldiers engaged in combat.84 When the German people learned that
their soldiers were being wounded and killed in Afghanistan, they were gravely
concerned and surprised. Many believed that German soldiers stationed in
Afghanistan were there to “help, protect, and secure” the Afghan people.85 German
society needed time to acclimate to the new roles their military was performing.86
Consequently, a new Bundeswehr generation has emerged. German
forces have been deployed on a regular basis and members of the force are suspicious of any colleagues and leaders who have not deployed. The 2003 Defense
Policy Guidelines87 declared that Innere Fuehrung would adapt to these new
tasks. A 2006 White Paper stated “The tenets of ‘Innere Fuehrung’—leadership development and civic education—will remain the Bundeswehr’s guiding
principles.”88 Critics have argued, however, that the change of the Bundeswehr
mission from defense to worldwide missions rendered Innere Fuehrung an
anachronistic ideal—no longer a viable principle for current missions. At the
same time, a group of mission-oriented, technocratic revisionist, senior officers
replaced the tradionalists. Accompanying these officers has been a return to the
“old” traditional thinking of the missions for the Bundeswehr. This group argues
that efficiency in missions is more important than Innere Fuehrung. From their
perspective, the peacetime concept of Innere Fuehrung does not address the
realities of current missions. They espouse a position that Innere Fuehrung
endangers soldiers when they participate in these missions.89 Recent scandals
in Coesfeld (2004) and in Afghanistan (2006) are reminiscent of actions that
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first appeared when the Bundeswehr was first reestablished.90 Again, a failure
to think issues through and slavish obedience to authority, combined with a
lack of human dignity, were evident in these scandals.
To address these issues, the latest version of the ZDv 10/1 seeks to restore
the value of Innere Fuehrung to a mission-oriented Bundeswehr.91 Nonetheless,
the concept of Innere Fuehrung remains under stress. As the Bundeswehr transitions to an all-volunteer force, the 3rd pillar of conscription has been removed
from Germany’s military.

Paradigm Change 4: Transition to an All-Volunteer Force
On 1 July 2011, the Bundeswehr established the all-volunteer force
following 54 years of conscription to adapt to the requirements for an expeditionary force with global reach. The conscript system had guaranteed a steady
supply of young men for the Bundeswehr and a wide dissemination of the
principles of Innere Fuehrung. More than eight million Germans have served
in the Bundeswehr. These veterans have deeply embedded their beliefs and
experiences in the Bundeswehr within the German state and society.92
The all-volunteer force concept will be challenged to sustain the
military’s link to society. In fact, we may see the army’s relationship with the
German people dramatically weakened.93 There is a belief that fewer young
Germans will join the all-volunteer force, and there is a risk that those who do
join may overrepresent specific segments of society. Wolffsohn, a historian at
the Bundeswehr University Munich,94 predicted that the “citizen in uniform”
will be replaced by the “underclass in uniform.”95 Indeed, the integration of
former NPA soldiers and a disproportionate number of East Germans in the
Bundeswehr have already changed the character of the force. The Bundeswehr
recruits one-third of its soldiers in the new Bundeslaender, where only onefifth of the German population lives96 —and where democratic conditions and
institutions have a short history. Without the third pillar of conscription,97
civil-military relations will need to be buttressed by the remaining two pillars
(Innere Fuehrung and “citizen in uniform”) to ensure the Bundeswehr remains
an integral part of society and the state.
The 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines assert that Innere Fuehrung and its
corollary of the “citizen in uniform” will remain unchanged. This policy envisions an expeditionary, combat-ready Bundeswehr, accepted within society and
the state, with a strong reputation for spreading democratic values worldwide.98
To achieve the proposed objectives of the Defense Policy Guidelines, much
more than a simple transformation is necessary. Instead, a revolutionary and
comprehensive approach,99 led by Parliament, is required. Such a transformation
needs to ensure adherence to the concept of Innere Fuehrung and the “citizen
in uniform.” The original intent for the founding of the Bundeswehr in accord
with the Basic Law was to avoid creating a “state within a state.” This intent
must be preserved. German citizens now have an opportunity to be involved in
a vital foreign and security policy discussion, led by Parliament and involving
the nation’s leadership. Widespread deliberation of this particular matter would
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dispel German society’s “polite disinterest,” as former Federal President Horst
Koehler described German citizens’ disengagement from civic issues.100
Even before the decision to suspend conscription in Germany, a number
of political scientists offered recommendations for adapting Innere Fuehrung
to these new missions and to an all-volunteer force. According to the political
scientist Professor Elmar Wiesendahl,101 the core principles of Innere Fuehrung
(primacy of civilian authority, respect of the Basic Law, and integration of the
army and society) must remain unchanged. So long as other changes in the
Bundeswehr do not violate Innere Fuehrung, these adaptations should proceed
to make the Bundeswehr a viable 21st century armed force.102 A recent number
of studies on the new missions and an all-volunteer force provide abundant
material for a broad public discussion on the future of the Bundeswehr.103
The Parliament, including the Chancellor, need to take the lead in assuring the Innere Fuehrung and the “citizen in uniform” retain their fundamental
roles in the all-volunteer force; Parliament is the constitutional leader of the
army. This adaptation is as critical as the post-war rearmament of Germany;
it should attract the same level of scrutiny. The Defense Committee should
be tasked to revive the subcommittee for “advancement of Innere Fuehrung.”
The subcommittee needs to work with Bundeswehr leaders and the ministerial
department of Innere Fuehrung to devise ways to embed this principle in the
new all-volunteer force.104 The Parliamentary Commissioner and the independent Advisory Council on Questions of Innere Fuehrung have to be included in
this deliberation. These four groups share responsibility for the future development of Innere Fuehrung. The Bundeswehr Association,105 with its unlimited
access to the public sector and direct access to the Minister of Defense, should
also be a criticial part of this process. The Parliamentary Commissioner would
be responsible for implementing recommendations, as directed by law. These
groups would be responsible for ensuring that the military recruiting and incentives programs106 are financed in such a manner as to increase diversity, attract
quality volunteers, and retain the best Bundeswehr soldiers.
Education also plays a critical role in this transition. In comparison
to the former conscript Bundeswehr, new volunteers will require an extended
education in ethics, history, and politics to compensate for any education shortfalls and to meet the higher standards associated with an expeditionary force.
The formulative education of officers and NCOs needs to be aligned in an
effort to assure the army’s linkage to society and to facilitate reintegration of
veterans into the civil sector. The Bundeswehr should establish exchange programs with industry and government agencies to support integration, linkage,
and mutual understanding. To sustain relationships with society, Bundeswehr
military careers need to parallel those of the US Army, which provides career
officers abundant opportunities for education and internships with civilian
universities, other agencies of government, and private businesses. Officers
who pursue such opportunities should quality for favorable promotion consideration. Likewise, Bundeswehr civilians need to study with the soldiers at the
Bundeswehr Universities, ensuring networking and greater understanding.107
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As in Lieutenant General Graf von Baudissin’s time, the Innere
Fuehrung department should be posted directly under the GenInsp [CJCS]
to signal its fundamental importance.108 In addition, GenInsps’ assistant for
education and training should become a “Management Assistant for Innere
Fuehrung” and report to the GenInsp and Defense Committee. The Bundeswehr
Institute for Social Sciences should be tasked with conducting annual surveys
on Innere Fuehrung with survey results presented directly to the Parliamentary
Commissioner.109 Finally, an information campaign needs to be undertaken at
every level, designed and implemented for the purpose of gaining trust in the
leadership’s ability to successfully transform the all-volunteer armed forces.

Summary
With its 55 years of successful history, the Bundeswehr has already
doubled the lifetime of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht combined. Innere
Fuehrung, with its vital corollary of “citizen in uniform,” ensures that the
Bundeswehr serves as a democratically structured and operated armed force
that remains acceptable to the majority of the German people. This concept
was initially challenged, but it has successfully adapted to the world’s complex
and uncertain strategic environment by adhering to its unchanging core
values (consistent with the Basic Law). With the transition to an all-volunteer
Bundeswehr, the pillar of conscription will no longer be available. Accordingly,
Innere Fuehrung’s other two pillars supporting civil-military relations need to
be strengthened in an effort to compensate for that loss. Assuming that this
will be a relatively simple transformation is not sufficient. A revolutionary
process, like the one that originally launched the Bundeswehr, is required. This
process has to be led by the Parliament, the ultimate master of the Bundeswehr.
The process should also include societal stakeholders if we are to ensure the
Bundeswehr remains an integrated and accepted part of German society.
Notes
1. Dr. Franz Josef Jung, “Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Order of the
Day of the Minister of Defense,” Bonn, January 28, 2011: Own translation. The Order of the Day is
available in the German version of Innere Fuehrung (Leadership Development and Civic Education),
Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1, Innere Fuhrung,” (Joint Service Regulation), (Bonn: Joint Forces
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